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SUMMARY

GENERAL

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GENERAL.

| | 1. Japanese | treaty negotia | tions with Natio | nalist China oppo | sed by UK: | |
|---------------|-----------------------------|--|--|--|---|---|
| 25X1A | ately on p | reliminary ne _l | a US propo ment that n would object | either the United | Japanese Govern- States nor Britai | n |
| | recognition that such a | out that he con n of the Nation approval would | erty claims, re ould not approve nalists as the Go d jeopardize the | presentation, and any move looking overnment of Chir bipartisan acceptaceived in the Bri | other practical g toward Japan's na. Eden feels | |
| | British appended the United | vigorous parti | ngthening the Ch | Any move at this ninese Nationalist cism directed in l | position would | |
| | until after | tne multilater | o postpone its na al peace treaty | se Government like egotiations with the comes into effect treaty's ratificati | he Nationalists | |
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NEAR EAST

| | 4. | Arab officials fear return of foreign spheres of influence: |
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| 25X1A | , | The Syrian Army Chief of Staff has informed the Lebanese Prime Minister that he believes the Middle East Command will result in the re-establishment of foreign spheres of and that under this defense plan France would again dominate Lebanon and Syria. |
| | | According to the US Minister in Beirut, the Lebanese Prime Minister is disturbed over the possibility of his country's virtual return to mandate relations with France. His concern has been aggravated by the fact that French supporters in Lebanon have been saying for some weeks that the Western defense plan would revive French suppremacy in the Levant. |
| | | Comment: Arab misunderstanding of the concept of the Middle East Command, as well as Soviet-sponsored propaganda, has encouraged the rise of rumors that the Western defense plan is actually a cover for the re-establishment of foreign spheres of influence in the Near East. Anxiety over their national independence is probably one of the important reasons why Arab officials have failed to give public support to Western defense proposals. |
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| | | EASTERN EUROPE |
| : | 5. | Yugoslav official interested in US aid for Cominform refugees: |
| 25X1A | | In a discussion with Ambassador Allen, Minister of Interior Rankovic expressed interest in a suggestion that the United States might help the Yugoslav Government in caring for Cominform refugees arriving in Yugoslavia. Allen mentioned the efforts of voluntary private American organizations to assist Cominform refugees and suggested that these organizations might be willing as a first |
| | | step to send food and clothing to these refugees in Yugoslavia. |
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Rankovic agreed that the treatment of Cominform refugees was highly important politically and promised to consider a proposal that a member of his staff keep in touch with the Embassy on this matter.

Yugoslav official has shown an interest in obtaining US assistance in caring for Cominform refugees,

Shortly after the influx of Bulgarian refugees into Yugoslavia last spring, the Yugoslav Government permitted Western correspondents to interview a number of them, but Western officials have never been given access to this potential reservoir of intelligence on the Satellite countries. Because Yugoslav treatment of refugees has improved, the number of those escaping across the border has increased in the past year.

WESTERN EUROPE

| 6. | General ag | reement | reached at first Western meeting with Adenauer: |
|----|------------|------------|--|
| | | | At the first meeting of the three Western |
| | | | Foreign Ministers and Chancellor Adenauer |
| • | | | on 22 November, approval was given to the |
| | | | terms of the General Agreement for West |
| _ | Germany, v | which will | go into effect when certain additional conventions |

Germany, which will go into effect when certain additional conventions and the European defense treaty are completed. French Foreign Minister Schuman, however, mentioned the limitation and prohibition of certain armaments production in the Federal Republic as a "difficult problem" which might have to be dealt with in a separate convention.

Adenauer stated his conviction that the decisions to be taken within the next few weeks would convince the USSR that it had failed to win over the Federal Republic by its cold war tactics.

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Comment: Before complete agreement is achieved on a new political status for Germany, understanding must still be reached not only on the security safeguards mentioned by Schuman, but on the Western "programs" such as decartelization and restitution, West Germany's share in defense costs, and the rights of Allied troops in Germany. At least another month is expected to be consumed in these negotiations.

| 7. | Failure of anti-Adenauer demonstration reveals French Communist | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|
| | weakness; | | | | |
| : | And Three Control And Andreas | | | | |
| 051/44 | The fiasco of the Communist-sponsored | | | | |
| 25X1A | demonstration during Chancellor Adenauer's | | | | |
| | visit to Paris proved the party's increasing | | | | |
| | isolation and inability to elicit militant sup- | | | | |
| | port to carry out Soviet foreign policy objectives, even on such impor- | | | | |
| | tant political issues as German rearmament. | | | | |
| | • | | | | |
| | Comment: During the past year French | | | | |
| | Communists have consistently failed to make an effective political dem- | | | | |
| | onstration against the government. Although the party planned this | | | | |
| | manifestation in compliance with Moscow's directive, the leaders evi- | | | | |
| | dently were unwilling to risk arrest by challenging the government's | | | | |
| - . | ban on demonstrations. Party leaders may also be losing their enthusi- | | | | |
| | asm for such activities, particularly since recent successes of their | | | | |
| labor policy show that popular support can be more readily of | | | | | |
| | for economic than for purely political objectives. | | | | |
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| 8. | French Christian Workers favor closer ties with international | | | | |
| | Communist groups: | | | | |
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| 1 | The executive committee of the French | | | | |
| 25X1A | Christian Workers Labor Confederation | | | | |
| | plans to send a delegation to the proposed | | | | |
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Moscow economic conference in April and has resolved to recommend to the Christian Labor International that it accept an invitation of the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions for joint discussions.

The leader of the Christian Workers left wing believes that the International will react coolly toward both of these projects. According to this spokesman, his confederation was about to announce a breaking off of negotiations with the Communist-led General Labor Confederation because of the latter's current campaign to unify organized labor under Communist leadership.

Comment: The Christian Workers Confederation is the most aggressive non-Communist labor group and has heretofore usually been willing to join in unity of action with the Communist-led confederation, its gestures toward closer international cooperation for labor's benefit may be intended to offset its new policy of rebuffing the dominant Communist-led confederation in France.

9. Austrian Foreign Minister comments on Vishinsky conversation:

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Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber states that Vishinsky, in a conversation on 19 November, indicated that an Austrian settlement would be achieved only as part of a

general settlement of East-West issues. Gruber is convinced that this settlement can not be long deferred, that the Russians may make an effort to arrive at an understanding next year, and that, if they believe they have failed, a "period of maximum danger" will arrive in 1952.

Comment: The Austrian Foreign Minister has frequently indicated his pessimism with regard to the prospects of an Austrian treaty at this time. He has, however, strongly supported Western efforts to reopen negotiations and has approved a US proposal for increasing pressure on the Soviet Union by introducing a new draft treaty into the discussions.

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